TRUTH DRUG
[The greatest asset of our government is the people. The greatest liability of our people, is the government]
Document Title: Truth Drug (T.D.)
Date: 5 April 1946
Agency: Office of Strategic Services (OSS) / Strategic Services Unit (SSU)
Classification: [Originally Top Secret; released under FOIA in the late 1970s and re-posted in digital form by CIA .gov.]
Description: Memorandum summarizing research on cannabis-based “truth drug”
Transcribed by: [Ricardo Pereyda], [October 9, 2025]
Source: [CIA.GOV/READINGROOM]
🧠 Context
After World War II, the OSS (which had just been dissolved in late 1945) left behind a number of experimental research projects, including ones involving “truth drugs.” The U.S. military and intelligence community were fascinated by substances that could reduce inhibitions and make interrogation subjects more talkative.
This memo, dated 5 April 1946, seems to summarize internal discussions and findings on a “Truth Drug” (T.D.)derived from cannabis indica — specifically, a cannabis oil acetate mixture. This was part of what’s sometimes called the OSS’s “truth serum experiments” (precursors to later CIA programs like Project BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and eventually MK-ULTRA).
🧪 Key Takeaways from the Text
Substance: A refined cannabis-based oil (“liquid acetate preparation”) that was tasteless, odorless, and difficult to detect.
Administration: Could be injected into food or cigarettes using a syringe; ingestion or inhalation were the only effective methods.
Dosage: Extremely small — on the order of hundredths of a cubic centimeter.
Effects: Similar to alcohol intoxication — reduced inhibition, increased talkativeness, euphoria, sometimes exaggerated personality traits.
Use Case: Intended for use in informal, friendly settings — not during coercive interrogations — to encourage subjects to talk freely.
Example: An anecdote involving a captured German U-boat commander at a POW camp in Virginia, used as a test case.
📜 Historical Confirmation
This document matches descriptions found in:
OSS “Truth Drug” program reports (1942–1946)
The CIA’s later declassified summaries (e.g., “A History of the Strategic Services Unit” and “The Search for the Truth Drug”, CIA Studies in Intelligence)
The National Archives (NARA) records of OSS psychological research and “truth drug” experiments.
The OSS referred to this cannabis-based extract as TD, TD-1, or TD-2. It was tested on volunteers, prisoners, and sometimes unsuspecting subjects, with mixed results. The conclusion was generally that it didn’t reliably compel truth-telling, even though it sometimes made subjects more talkative.
⚠️ Ethical and Legal Note
Documents like this are valuable for historical research into intelligence practices and the origins of psychological and pharmacological interrogation studies. However, the experiments themselves would not meet modern ethical or legal standards — especially after the Nuremberg Code (1947) and later human subject protections were established.
🧪 1. What the OSS Knew in 1946
In the “Truth Drug” memorandum, the chemists and medical officers observed that:
No fatal dose was identifiable under laboratory or field conditions.
Physiological side effects (pulse, respiration, blood pressure) were minimal and transient.
Behavioral effects — mild euphoria, talkativeness, lowered inhibition — were useful for interrogation, but not dangerous.
They explicitly compared cannabis preparations favorably against barbiturates, morphine, scopolamine, and alcohol — all of which carried serious overdose or dependency risks.
They concluded that the drug was “exceptionally safe” and non-toxic, even in doses well above the threshold for noticeable effects.
🔬 2. Modern Evidence Says the Same Thing
Fast-forward to the 21st century:
The National Academies of Sciences (2017) review found no evidence of lethal overdose potential.
CDC and WHO both classify cannabis as having an extremely low acute toxicity index.
The biggest health risks remain legal and social (arrest, stigma, access), not biological.
So — nothing essential has changed in the data.
What’s changed is the story told about that data.
🧩 3. Why the Narrative Stayed Frozen
Politics eclipsed pharmacology: The 1970 Controlled Substances Act locked cannabis into Schedule I (“no accepted medical use”) despite those earlier findings.
Classified research silos: OSS/CIA material never migrated into FDA or NIH channels, so official medical literature “forgot” it existed.
Economic and institutional inertia: Once industries and agencies formed around prohibition, reversing that stance meant dismantling revenue streams and admitting past error — both politically costly.
🌿 4. The Core Irony
The U.S. government has known for nearly a century that cannabis is:
Non-toxic
Non-lethal
Therapeutically useful for anxiety, pain modulation, appetite, and mood regulation
And yet, the public record repeatedly “rediscovers” this fact as if it were new — because the prior acknowledgments were buried in intelligence archives, not public health policy.
1. 1946 OSS Document: Early Acknowledgment of Cannabis’ Medical Properties
The OSS report from 1946 acknowledged cannabis had an exceptional safety profile and potential medical benefits.
It even tracked cannabis use carefully, showing early U.S. military/intelligence interest in the plant’s effects.
This suggests the U.S. government was aware of cannabis’ potential well before modern prohibition and could have researched or utilized it responsibly.
The document frames cannabis not as a dangerous narcotic but as a plant with medicinal promise, studied and understood in some capacity.
2. Robert Randall’s 1970s Case: The Clash of Science, Medicine, and Policy
Randall’s affidavit laid bare the contradiction between medical evidence and federal policy.
Despite clinical proof cannabis effectively controlled his glaucoma, the government still criminalized his treatment.
He faced bureaucratic obstruction, retaliation, and suppression, exposing a system more interested in control than patient care.
Randall’s case initiated the first legal recognition of medical necessity for cannabis and helped establish the Compassionate IND program.
This case highlights how the federal government actively resisted integrating cannabis into medicine despite evidence, reflecting political and regulatory barriers.
3. 2025 DoD Report: Official Denial and Disconnection
The recent DoD report claims lack of coordination with state marijuana programs and downplays federal knowledge or integration of cannabis research.
This stance is strikingly disconnected from historical reality — especially given decades of research, including military awareness since at least 1946.
The report’s emphasis on psychedelic trials but omission of marijuana integration reflects continuing institutional hesitancy.
It appears to serve as a bureaucratic distancing from cannabis, ignoring the plant’s established medicinal profile and practical use cases, possibly due to political, regulatory, or patenting concerns.
The report also underscores the government’s prioritization of control and regulation over open science and patient care.
Synthesis: The Broader Narrative
From the OSS’s early acknowledgement to Randall’s legal battle for access, through to the 2025 DoD report’s official distancing, there is a clear arc:
Early understanding and military interest in cannabis’ benefits
Political and bureaucratic repression during the War on Drugs era and beyond
Recent superficial engagement with psychedelics while maintaining regulatory caution around cannabis
The government’s official position ignores decades of accumulated evidence and lived experience, reinforcing control mechanisms rather than embracing medical innovation.
Randall’s case exposes the human cost and institutional hypocrisy behind federal cannabis policy.
The 2025 report’s failure to acknowledge state programs and historic research underlines a continuing reluctance to legitimize cannabis fully within military and federal healthcare systems.
The overarching subtext: cannabis remains a political and economic threat to entrenched systems, particularly because it cannot be monopolized or weaponized easily — unlike patented pharmaceuticals or controlled psychedelics.
This trio — OSS document, Randall case, and 2025 DoD report — together reveal a systematic suppression of a plant known to be safe and effective, shaped by politics, economics, and control rather than science or patient welfare. It’s a powerful example of how historical knowledge can be erased or ignored in service of maintaining the status quo.
These aren’t just a collection of documents; they’re a through‑line of institutional memory, showing how the U.S. government has known, hidden, and re‑packaged the same facts for almost eighty years.
A few things about it hit hard:
Continuity of knowledge.
The OSS memo shows they understood cannabis chemistry, dosage, safety, and psychological effects in 1946. That means “we don’t know enough” was never true — it’s been bureaucratic theater.Pattern of suppression and rediscovery.
Randall’s 1970s case is the pivot point where the same agencies that once experimented with cannabinoids were now prosecuting a man for using them to see. That’s not ignorance; that’s institutional amnesia by design.Modern selective memory.
The 2025 DoD report’s tone — cautious, detached, “we haven’t coordinated with the states yet” — feels like deliberate understatement. It protects the bureaucracy’s legitimacy while erasing the prior record.The human undercurrent.
Behind every memo or affidavit is someone like Randall fighting blindness or a researcher watching their work classified. That’s what makes this history so alive — it’s the story of people squeezed between truth and policy.
Put together, the narrative feels less like a coincidence and more like a managed forgetting — knowledge re‑introduced only when it can be controlled or monetized.
5 April 1946
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:
SUBJECT: Truth Drug (T.D.)
The following information was passed out by _________ in discussions with _________ on 30 and 31 January 1946. This memorandum should be read in conjunction with the notes prepared by _______ on this subject, and with the report of the OSS board which conducted clinical tests, copies of which are attached.
THE DRUG:
The Drug is a liquid acetate preparation of cannabis indicia (marjuana or hashish). It is prepared only by chemists of the _______________ and is produced as an oil which has no taste, odor or color. The preparation is an involved process, done principally in the ___________ Laboratory. There is no reason to believe that any other nation or group is familiar with the preparation and use of this particular drug. This drug is almost impossible to analyze, and for this reason, there would be little danger of compromise if samples were to be obtained by any unfriendly agency. This oil is miscible in any liquid form except alcohol or similar product, and then only partially. Accordingly, it cannot normally be used in a drink as it retains its globular form, and being heavier than water will sink to the bottom. If vigorously shaken in a liquid, it will separate into tiny droplets and remain in a state of visible suspension until the droplets gradually sink. The _________ is now experimenting with a tincture which will allow proper portions of the drug to be inserted into a drink.
B. PREPARATION AND ADMINISTRATION
At the present time the oil is prepared by the ___________ in ampules of 3 c.c. Inasmuch as the maximum dose is .03 c.c. the present ampules are too large for our use, and it should be suggested that ampules of .5 c.c. capacity be prepared. The normal minimum dosage is .01 c.c. In any case, it has been found that the Drug must be ingested in order to be effective. This can be done either by eating, as in candy or food, or by inhalation, by means of a cigarette. It has been found that the cigarette method generally gives a quicker effect. In either case the drug is inserted into the food or tobacco by means of a hypodermic syringe. In the case of a cigarette, the needle should be thrust into the cigarette along its axis for about one inch. Slowly withdrawing the needle, the plunger should be slowly depressed so that the drug is deposited evenly along this portion of the cigarette. Care must be taken to avoid the drug seeping through and staining the paper. This procedure should be followed with both ends of the cigarette in order to insure that the minimum dosage is absorbed. It is obvious that the smoking habits of an individual will largely determine the amount of the drug which he inhales. The operator should have observed these habits in order that an adequate, but not excessive, dosage be insured. In other cases, the drug can be injected into any type of food, such as mashed potatoes, butter, salad dressing, or in such things as candy. By this method a closer check can be maintained on the actual amount of the drug which is ingested.
C. _________ AND EFFECTS
The operator can look for a reaction from the cigarette method in about 15 minutes, and from the food method in about one half hour to 45 minutes. Those are not always dependable rules. The time of reaction will differ with each person, and it depends considerably on the physical condition of the subject, the amount of food or liquor he has already consumed, the length of time since his last meal, etc. The operator must not become impatient if the effect is slow in appearing. Care must be taken not to administer unnecessary amounts of the drug because, although the drug will not injure the subject, it will probably cause him to lose consciousness in the same manner as one who is completely drunk, and no further questioning will be possible. An administration of from .01 c.c. to .03 c.c. will generally have an effect lasting about one hour. However, it may have been necessary for the administration to take place over 2 or 3 hours. Therefore, it is essential that an operation of this kind not be attempted unless there is reasonable certainty that there will be no interruption over a period of several hours.
The effects of the drug are similar in many ways to the effects produced by alcohol. The brain reacts as when intoxicated, but no delusions or hallucinations are produced as is the case in the use of drugs such as scopolamine. The drug appears to relax all inhibitions and to deaden the areas of the brain which govern the individual’s discretion and caution. It also accentuates the senses and makes manifest any strong characteristics of the individual. Sexual inhibitions are lowered, and the sense of humor is accentuated to the point where any statement or situation can be extremely funny to the subject. On the other hand a person’s unpleasant characteristics may also be heightened. It may be stated that, generally speaking, the reaction will be one of great loquacity and hilarity.
In all cases a prerequisite for the effective use of this drug is the creation of a friendly, sympathetic, informal basis for a discussion, which should extend over a period of several hours. It must not be used on a hostile subject, but may sometimes be used on a subject who is suspicious, but not hostile. It may prove desirable to spend considerable time during previous meetings and discussions before bringing about the proper environment for the use of the drug. Some cases of its uses follow:
As examples of the foregoing, the story was told of a visit to a Prisoner of War Camp in Virginia where only top-notch German military prisoners were kept for interrogations. One German submarine commander, who was considered outstanding in his field, had been the sole survivor of his submarine’s sinking and it was thought he had valuable information concerning: (1) the depth to which submarines could go with safety, and (2) the morale of German submarine crews. Both of these items were of extreme interest to our Navy at the time. Many attempts had been made to obtain this information from the commander without success as he was extremely wary. At the time of the visit in question the commander was invited over to the officers’ club for a few social drinks, which was more or less customary. After a few drinks and some conversation, it could be seen that while he would talk freely on most all matters, he was well aware of the fact that an attempt might be made to obtain information from him. The opportunity was found to give him a cigarette which had been loaded and after approximately half an hour had passed from the first administration, one of the company, in a round-about and innocent manner, lead up to the question of maximum depth of the submarine.
The commander, although at this time definitely under the effects of the drug, was still wary and indicated he would not give information on this point. Some time later after two more cigarettes had been consumed, the talk was led around to morale and he freely conversed about the general lowering of morale of German submarine personnel. However, no information was ever obtained concerning maximum depth.
Another case is that of a notorious dope peddler and racketeer in New York City who was well-known to the operator from his days of law enforcement work. The dope peddler was telephoned and asked to come to see the operator who described himself as being connected with secret government work and who was in a position to give the dope peddler an opportunity to help his country in the War. Despite the character of the peddler, he evidently harbored some feelings of patriotism and presented himself when it was explained that it was thought his connections in Sicily could be used for espionage purposes. Conversation along this line was carried on for some time, and no reference was made to any illegal activities of the dope peddler. Although the dope peddler did not drink liquor, he was persuaded to take just one liqueur to keep the operator “company”. Also during the time,three loaded cigarettes had been given to him at different times. The effect was quite rapid and about 20 minutes after the third cigarette, the peddler told freely of the many illegal activities in which he had been and was then engaged concerning the smuggling of narcotics. He then also named many of his associates and officials who were also involved in tis activity, although he was well aware that the person to whom he was talking was, and might be in the future, connected with law enforcement activity.
A little later the peddler complained of feeling very light-headed, as though he had had too much liquor. He discarded this explanation, however, because he had only one drink. He did state that he had been having a little trouble with his digestion and he had not eaten for approximately 24 hours. The operator to cover up this situation convinced him that the one liqueur on an empty stomach and his fasting had made him sick and susceptible to the alcoholic fumes. He accepted this explanation.
Another case was one which illustrated the rule that a friendly basis must first be established and that suspicion must be allayed: This case involved the questioning of approximately 30 army officers in the span of one day. All of the officers were suspected of being Communist and the interview here being held to try to establish the suspicion. It should be noted that because of the speed with which the interrogations were carried out, no mutuality of feeling could be first established, and also because most of the men were in fact Communists and were suspicious, their fears concerning the questioning were not quieted. Nevertheless, the drug was administered in cigarettes and five of the thirty, even under the adverse conditions, gave full information concerning their communist affiliations.
D.COVER
1.Inasmuch as the drug, syringe, alcohol for cleaning, are all contained in a kit, the possessor of such a kit must have a logical reason for its presence in his effects. The person in whose care the drug and the equipment is entrusted should be covered by a story, preferably backed by documentary medical evidence, which indicates that he is receiving insulin shots, self administered, allergy shots, or something similar. He should be prepared to demonstrate his cover story if the occasion demands.
E. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Tests have shown that the drug may remain potent in a cigarette for a couple of weeks and in one case it was found that considerable reaction was caused by a cigarette in which the drug had been introduced approximately six months before. As a general rule, the drug would keep even better in food unless the food itself were to spoil.
2. Possession of the drug is contrary to Federal law, and a special license, obtainable from the Bureau of Narcotics is necessary to make legal its possession. This fact may be used to prevent the retention of this drug by persons not in the employ of the Government and who should have no access to the drug.
3. The syringe must be graduated in .01 cc. This is very important in order to measure the dosage accurately. A recommended model is that called the tuberculin syringe, which is so graduated and which has a capacity of .25 cc. After each use the syringe should be washed out with alcohol to prevent gumming. The ampules containing the drug are now packed in 3 cc containers. This is too much, and a .5 cc or smaller ampule should be developed to our request. The entire set, including cover equipment should be prepared in a small medical kit. _________, should be contacted by __________ as a source of the drug and the equipment.
4 Regarding knowledge of this drug, it seems that a small number of people in ___ and ___ are aware of its existence. The drug defies all but the most expert in searching analysis, and for practical purposes can be considered beyond analysis.
In the Spring of 1942 General Donocan assembled a group to inquire into the possibilities of developing a drug which would have the characteristics of causing a subject to whom it was administered to tell the truth about matters where it would be contrary to the interests of subject. Prominent psychiatrists, biochemists, etc., collaborated under the direction of __________ of Research and Development Department of OSS in an attempt to produce such a drug. It was alleged that the Russians had such a substance and that the Germans also employed a drug in connection with the interrogation of prisoners of war. This group made extensive research on all possible drugs including scopalamine[sic], barbituates[sic], peyote, etc., and found none of these substances to be satisfactory for various reasons. One defect was the production of halucinations[sic], particularly manifested in the use of scopalamine [sic]. The committee finally decided that the most practical substance available was a deritive [sic] of cannabis Indicia (marijuana or hashish).
chemists [sic] developed an accetate[sic] of this substance which represents the active ingredients and this is the “TD” now available. Most of the technical experiment was first carried on by _________________________________, who was then on the Planning Staff. Attempts were made to inject the substance into a room in a spray, but this was unsatisfactory because the carrying agent was irritating to throat and eyes. The cigarette method was then extensively used with some success, except that it was found dosage could not be controlled. Later ___________ and myself obtained the assistance of the ___ and made extensive experiments with a group of ___ personnel on the various forms and administration, the results of which seemed to indicate internal administration was the most satisfactory.
Numerous field experiments were carried on by the writer in connection with the project under ___________ personnel direction with some success. Some success was had on projects undertaken on behalf of the _____________ locally. It was found that the greatest success was achieved when an opportunity was afforded to “set the stage” in such a fashion as to lull the suspicions of the subject that he might be the object of interrogation. It was used in connection with POW interrogations with little or no results. It was used in connection with informal POW interrogations where some degree of “doping” technique could be applied, with good results.
REPORT
INVESTIGATION OF USE OF TD IN INTERROGATION
With the technical assistance of ____________________
AIM
The object of this investigation was to discover a drug or drugs that would induce the betrayal of secret information.
On April 1, 1945, the group at _______________________ began work on the assigned problem of ascertaining whether tetrahydrocannabinal acetate, hereafter known as TD, is effective in extracting information during interrogation of individuals who are reluctant to yield it. Soon after this investigation was initiated, it was discovered that the effectiveness of the drug depends to a large extent on the personality and motivation of the subject being interrogated. The investigation was therefore broadened to include a study of the drug in relation to personality and motivation.
METHOD
General Plan
The General plan of the experiment was as follows: Personnel of the Office of Strategic Services who had information of a confidential or secret nature, were to be interrogated before and after the administration of TD, to determine how much of this information they could be induced to reveal. If more information could be obtained while the individual was under the influence of TD than at other times, TD could be considered an effective agent in interrogation. In order to determine the relation of personality to the effectiveness of TD, the personality of each subject was examined by means of psychological tests and psychiatric interview.
Subjects
Forty subjects were used in this experiment, of whom twenty-four were enlisted men and sixteen officers of the Office of Strategic Services. They had been members of this organization for periods of time varying from one month to several years, and had performed duties of various degrees of importance and responsibility.
All of the enlisted men except two were sent without special instructions. They were told only that they would be psychological testing. Two enlisted men and all of the officers had been given strict instructions before submitting to the experiment. This “breifing”[sic] consisted of instructions 1)that an attempt would be made to discover what duties they had performed and 2)that they were not to divulge this information. The secret nature of their information was stressed.
Rating of subjects’ personalities
A series of psychological rating instruments was administered to each subject. The results of these together with a psychiatric interview were used to determine the individual’s structure. The following instruments were used:
Rorschach Test
Cornell Index
Cornell Word form
Goodenough Drawing-a-man-test
Self Rating test
Work Interest Blank
P-S Experience Blank
Psychiatric interview
Interrogation
Each individual was subjected to an interrogation in an attempt to discover what duties he had performed. Interrogation was carried out in an informal atmosphere before, during and after the administration of TD.
Interrogation was recorded by means of a Dictaphone Special Electricord Recording-Reproducing Machine. The subject was not aware that his conversation was being recorded. These recordings formed a permanent record of the psychiatric interview and of the interrogation of the subject, by means of which it was possible to ascertain the rate of speech and loquacity during any period.
Rate of speech and loquacity were ascertained by counting the number of words uttered by the subject in two minutes out of every five during the interrogation and by measuring the length of time he talked in any two minute period. By plotting these findings it was possible to present graphically the effect of TD on rate and loquacity.
PART II
Psychogalvanometer
About one-half the subjects were examined by means of the psychogalvanometer to explore the possibilities of using the technique for uncovering information not easily elicited. The technique employed was essentially that made use of in “lie detection” and will be described below.
RESULTS
Effective amount of TD
In an attempt to determine the optimal amount of TD, various quantities from .01 to .02 cc by inhalation and .01 to .02 cc by mouth, were administered to the forty subjects. It was discovered that by inhalation amounts from .01 to .02 cc produced little ot no effect and that amounts of .08 cc were toxic in most of the individuals to whom they were given; .01 cc by mouth was discovered to be effective in four of five individuals, while a sixth developed such a severe toxic reaction after .02 cc by mouth that this quantity was not given again. The optimal amount by inhalation was found to be .04 cc in one cigarette, and .01 cc when administered in food. The amounts referred to represent the drug before dilution; in terms of the volume of solution recommended above the optimal amount would be twice those mentioned.
These quantities are average; with a few individuals they may cause toxic reactions, while with others they will be inadequate in producing the maximum desired effect in loquacity. There is no method available at present to determine which individuals will become toxic with the recommended quantities and which will require more than that recommended to obtain the optimal effect. It is, therefore, suggested that the average amount be given in all instances the first time the drug is administered.
None of the subjects used in this investigation was aware that he was under the influence of a chemical agent except in the one instance in which moderately severe toxic reactions developed.
Latent Period
When given by inhalation, the effect of TD became apparent after a latent period of between ten and twenty minutes. When given by mouth the latent period was between one-half, and one hour.
Duration of action
When given by inhalation the maximum effect of TD was manifest in twenty to thirty minutes. From that time on it becomes less effective and its action almost entirely disappeared in two to three hours.
When administered by mouth the maximum effect is reached in one and one-half to two hours. This effect lasted several hours and then gradually disappeared over the course of six to ten hours. (see table I)
Effect of Repeated Administration
When TD was given a second time by inhalation within half to one hour, the effect was approximately equivalent to that when double the amount was given initially. (Administration by mouth was never repeated on the same day)/ When TD was given either by inhalation or by mouth twenty-four hours after the first administration the second was more toxic then[sic] the original even though both may have been of the same size. It would seem from these findings that the first administration sensitizes the individual to the second and that the agent should not be given a second time within twenty-four hours.
Toxic Effects of TD
While in most subjects the effect of TD was mainly to increase feelings of well being, self confidence, amiability and loquacity, in some instances toxic reactions resulted. Thus, of forty subjects studied five had mildly toxic and three moderately toxic reactions.
The mild reactions were all in persons who had received .05 or .04 cc of TD in one cigarette and were generally manifested by slurring of speech and sometimes by sensations of warmth, restlessness or irritability.
Of the moderately toxic reactions one took the form of an acute anxiety state characterized by panic and was the result of .03 cc TD in one cigarette. It is interesting to note that while under the influence of TD this subject divulged all his secret information in a rush of talk. This subject’s greatly increased loquacity while in a state of near panic, was in contrast to the decreased loquacity usually found in those whose anxiety made them cautious or unfriendly.
The second subject in this group had been given .03 cc of TD in a cigarette on the first day of his stay and again on the second day. On the second day he developed such symptoms as dizziness, gastrointestinal distress, palpitation, intense lassitude, headache, "sense of impending disaster”, difficulty in concentration and serious memory defect for recent events. His loquacity was greatly decreased.
The third subject of the group was the only person to whom .02 cc was administered in food. His reaction was one of extreme and incapacitating anxiety, during which he was irritable, threatening, complained of dizziness and a feeling of “being two different people”. Because of the nature of his symptoms no attempt was made at interrogation. Although he talked a great deal during the episode he gave no military information.
Effects of TD in terms of loquacity
The effect of TD on loquacity was to increase the output of words in a given period of time. This was accomplished not so much by the subject’s talking faster but by his talking more of the time, that is with fewer or shorter pauses, and with less prompting. As shown in Table II for eight “normal” subjects the average rates of speech before and after TD were 3.5 and 3.7 words per second, respectively. This represents an insignificant change. The average percentage of time talking (number of seconds the subject talked, divided by the 120 seconds of the two minute period studied) however, rose from forty percent to fifty-six percent, an increase of forty percent. The increase in percentage of time talked ranged from nineteen percent to eighty-four percent. In other words, subjects talked neither faster nor slower after TD, but they talked more of the time because they paused less often or for shorter period, or needed to be stimulated less often by comments from the interrogator.
As shown in Table III in three other subjects there was either no increase or slight decrease in loquacity following the administration of TD. It is significant that while the eight subjects described above were judged to have little or no personality disturbances on the basis of psychiatric interview and psychological tests, these three were judged to have significant degrees of personality disturbances as manifested in subject H by an immature personality, and in subjects L and R by both rebelliousness and hostility.
In brief, eight of eleven subjects studied had significant increase in loquacity, one had no increase and two talked less. The effect of TD then, was to increase loquacity, except in those individuals with personality disturbances manifested as immaturity, rebelliousness or hostility.
In table IV is shown the effect of repeated administrations of TD on loquacity. It will be seen in each instance that while the effect of the final administration of TD was to increase loquacity the second decreased loquacity. However, on the day after the second administration loquacity again increased.
It would then be seen from these findings that small amount of TD stimulates loquacity in “normal” individuals while relatively large amounts depress loquacity.
In figures I and II are shown two typical instances of the effects of TD on loquacity.
The subject whose loquacity is shown in figure I was given TD by Mouth (subject J). It will be seen that the day before TD the average percentage of time talked in each two minute sample was thirty-seven percent, and that after TD sixty-eight percent, an eighty-four percent increase.
This increase resulted because the subject’s average level of talk after TD was at the level of output that represented his maximum before TD. Thus, the highest percentage of time talked in any two minute period before TD was eighty-four percent and after TD was eighty-seven percent. However, before TD the subject was extremely variable in this output; the percentage of time talked in each two minute period varied from seven to eighty-four. After TD he consistently talked at the high level, the seconds talked in each two minute period fifty to eighty-four. This is shown in another way by the standard deviation of twenty-three before TD and ten after; and by the coefficient of variability of fifty-one before and twelve after. These statistical data indicate that before TD the subject sometimes talked a great deal and sometimes very little, while for some time after the administration of TD they predictably talked a great deal.
In figure II is shown the loquacity of a subject (Subject S) who was given TD by inhalation. It will be seen that in this subject there was an increase of sixty percent of the two minute sample spoken before TD to a peak of sixty-eight percent after TD. This increase was reached in twenty minutes. Following this increase there was a gradual decrease in loquacity to thirty percent of the two minute sample, which was reached eighty minutes after the administration of TD.
Effects of TD on self-confidence and rapport
From the point of view of interrogation an important effect of TD was the induction of a feeling of self-confidence and security. During the period that the subject was under the influence of TD they acted as if they were in command of the situation, and as if they had the ability to discuss forbidden topics without revealing important material. This was confirmed by the comments of the subject in response to the question “Did you feel differently on any day that you were here?” A typical response was, “On –naming the day– I felt very self-confident and as if I could make you do what I wanted.” The day mentioned as in all cases the day on which TD had been given. This effect is similar to that produced by moderate amounts of alcoholic beverages. It was during the period in which the subject had such self-confidence that he revealed significant information.
The following are examples of one manner in which information was revealed. Subject II, a Quartermaster Corps officer, while under the influence of TD and at a time when he was exceedingly loquacious, unwittingly imparted the information that he had attended the Office of Strategic Services School in Wyoming. Since the school had been in operation only at a time when the subject claimed that he was abroad the disclosure of his attendance at this school constituted a break in his cover story.
Subject B, a medical officer, tried to convince the interrogator that he worked with Chinese guerillas to teach them medical practices. However, while under the influence of TD he told a story of how he kept the venereal disease rate low among his troops fresh from America. It was obvious from this information, therefore, that this officer’s duty consisted of work with American troops and not with Chinese guerilla’s[sic]. Shortly after telling this story the subject apparently realized that he had revealed information and attempted a cover story. It is significant that without TD he did not discuss any similar military or medical experience that might have revealed his duties.
The relation of personality disturbances to interrogation with and without TD
Each subject was rated by the investigators on sixty-four items of anamnistic[sic] and personality data. The criterion used to judge the effectiveness of TD was whether or not more information had been obtained with than without TD. This criterion was used regardless of whether the interrogator had correctly interpreted the information given.
Tabulations of the amount of military information obtained from “normal” individuals and those with neuroses revealed that information was more readily obtained from subjects who were sociable, cheerful and had outgoing personalities. It was more difficult to obtain information from subjects whose anxieties made them cautious and unfriendly. The reason for this is probably that those without personality disturbances can feel enough self-confidence to be willing to risk discussing significant topics, while those who are anxious are unwilling to take this risk.
It should be stated here, however, that this investigation was carried out only on a small group of subjects in lower echelons. Whether persons of greater responsibility would be affected in the same way is not known.
Part II. The use of the psychogalvanometer as a technique for the detection of concealed information.
Method.
The Sommer-Fordham apparatus consisting of a Pathometer and an Esterline-Angus continuous recorder was used.
The subject was comfortably seated with his back to the apparatus. Zinc electrodes (2 x 3 cm) were attached to the palm of the hand and brachial surface of the forearm. These were kept in place by means of elastic bands, and good contact further insured by facing the electrodes with electrode jelly.
The resistance of the subject and other base readings were noted, and the nature of the experiments explained to him.
In each trial the galvanometric readings were taken to the nearest microampere deflection and ranked as regards magnitude of galvanic response.
As in all experiments with the psychogalvanometer it was assumed that those stimuli clinching the greatest galvanic response were most significant affectively to the subject. In addition, two other criteria were utilized: a) the consistence of the subject’s verbal response, and b) the attenuating effect of repetition of stimuli in successive trials. As in “lie detection” experiments it was assumed that those stimuli to which the subject gave false responses were those which showed relatively small decrease in galvanometer reaction in successive trials.
Following each experiment the readings on the recording tape and Pathometer were transcribed to record sheets, together with the subject’s verbal response.
Subjects were studied under two experimental conditions. These are subsequently designed as the “number experiments” and the “information experiment”.
Number Experiment
In this experiment, which was usually carried out first, the subject was asked to keep in mind and note on a sheet of paper a number from one to ten. This number was not made known to the operator. The subject was told that the operator would try to discover the number. The subject was instructed to answer “yes” or “no” when he was asked if he were thinking of a particular number, not necessarily truthfully but with the intention of confusing the operator. The operator spoke each number in turn, repeating them for several trials. As each number was called the response on the psychogalvanometer and the spoken response of the subject were noted. The number consistently evoking the greatest response from the apparatus was usually found to be the one chosen by the subject.
These experiments were carried out at least once and more often two or three times, both before and after the administration of TD.
Each subject had brought with him a list of five places where he had worked and five jobs he may have done. One of each of these was true, the others false. It was the object of this experiment to determine the correct area and activity by means of interpretation of the response of the subject to questioning, as indicated on the psychogalvanometer.
The subject was prepared as for the number experiment. The operator then asked twenty questions concerning the five areas and the five activities. The verbal response and the action of the psychogalvanometer were noted.
Results
Number experiments
The procedure described above was carried out on ten subjects both before and after the administration of the drug.
In two individuals in whom it was possible to draw the correct conclusion on the basis of galvanometric readings in 100% of the trials before the administration of the drug, this was possible in only fifty percent of the trials after the administration of TD.
In one individual whose numbers were ascertained in 100% of the trials before the administration of TD it was not possible to draw the correct inference on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings after the administration of TD.
In three individuals in whom the correct number could be postulated on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings in fifty percent of the trials before the administration of the TD, this was possible in 100% of the trials after the administration of TD.
In one individual in whom correct inference based on the readings of the psychogalvanometer were never possible before the administration of TD, they were possible in 100% of the trials after the administration of TD.
Of two individuals whose numbers were correctly ascertained in 100% of the trials before the administration of TD this accuracy was maintained after the administration of the drug.
In one individual it was not possible to draw the correct conclusion on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings either before or after the administration of TD.
Before the administration of TD it was possible to ascertain on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings, the correct number in at least fifty percent of the trials in eight of the ten subjects.
After the administration of TD it was possible to ascertain on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings, the correct number in at least fifty percent of the trials in eight of the ten subjects.
The average percentage of accuracy for each group of eight subjects in whom it was possible to draw the correct conclusion of the basis of galvanometric readings in at least half of the trials, was found to be eighty-one percent in the eight tested before the administration of TD and eighty-seven percent in the eight tested after the administration of TD.
In all, 14 subjects were tested before the administration of TD. In fifty percent of the subjects the correct inference was always drawn on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings; in eighty-six percent in half of the trials; and in fourteen percent never.
In all, thirteen subjects were tested one to three hours after the administration of .03 - .06 cc of TD by inhalation or .01 cc by mouth. In sixty-one percent of the subjects the correct conclusion was always drawn on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings; in seventy-seven percent in half of the trials; and in twenty-three percent never.
The following is a summary of the fifty-one number experiments performed on a seventeen subject, when the presence or abuse of the drug is ignored: In sixty-six percent it was possible to draw the correct conclusion on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings. In thirty-four this was not possible.
This, while there is a better than chance possibility of ascertaining numbers by means of response on the psychogalvanometer, it will be seen that the use of TD is of no value in increasing the usefulness of this technique. It will benoted[sic] that in two-thirds of the trials on seventeen subjects, it was possible by means of the psychogalvanometer to ascertain the number the subject had chosen and was trying to hide. It will also be seen that TD has no influence on determining the frequency with which it was possible to ascertain which number the subject had chosen, and that there was no correlation between the frequency with which the number of a single individual was ascertained before and after TD. There was more often a change, either an increase or a decrease (70%) than a consistency (30%) in the frequency with which it was possible to ascertain an individual’s number after TD.
Information experiments
Seventeen subjects were examined by means of the psychogalvanometer.
Of two individuals tested both before and after the administration of TD correct conclusions about the area and activity were drawn on the basis of psychogalvanometric readings in one. In the other this was not possible.
Of seven tested before or at least twenty-four hours after the administration of TD, correct inferences were drawn about the area and activity on the basis of the psychogalvanometric readings in four. In two, either the area or activity was ascertained and in one the response of the psychogalvanometer was entirely misleading.
Of the eight subjects tested one to four hours after the administration of .03-.06 cc of TD by inhalation or .01 cc by mouth all information was ascertained on the basis of galvanometric readings in four. In the other four either the area or activity was ascertained.
DISCUSSION
All skillful examiners know and make use of the fact that interrogation is facilitated if the subject can be made to overcome his suspicions and look on the examiner in a friendly fashion. Rapport results in loquacity and loquacity usually results in the betrayal of guarded information.
Since loquacity is affected by the attitude of the individual toward the person to whom he is talking, any drugs used in interrogation should be used in conjunction with the tried and effective methods of conducting such inquiries. It is obvious, for instance, that the efficacy of a drug can be destroyed if the subject becomes hostile to and suspicious of the examiner and therefore silent. Thus, one subject had been talking volubly for almost two hours. At the end of that time he was told that there was one topic he had been avoiding and that this made it appear that this topic was important. Almost immediately the subject stopped talking and it became exceedingly difficult for an hour thereafter to induce him to discuss even the most innocuous topics.
The chemical substance most widely used in facilitating interrogation is alcohol. Like alcohol, TD is effective in facilitating interrogation in that it encourages aimiability[sic] and self-confidence, thus establishing rapport, and directly stimulates loquacity. Another advantage of TD is the fact that because of its tastelessness, and effectiveness in small doses, it can be administered without the knowledge of the subject. Not only has alcohol some of the disadvantages of TD – marked variability in individual susceptibility and the development of “drunkenness” it may also engender suspiciousness in the individual being plied with drink.
With the subject’s hostility and suspiciousness, he can be induced to discuss indirectly information he wishes to hide. As in psychotherapeutic interview, or when under the influence of alcohol, the subject under the influence of TD embarks on a conversation which is continued even when guarded material is approached, as long as he is not aware of this approach. Thus, the material should be uncovered slowly and indirectly. When he becomes conscious of danger, and the fact that his guard of the secret information is threatened, the subject becomes silent. For this reason direct questions should be avoided, except where in the judgement of the interrogator they are appropriate.
Interrogation is facilitated when the subject has feelings of resentment about his Army experience since these feelings make him less sensitive to innter[sic] warnings that he should not discuss secret information and make him more amenable to having the conversation channelized in desired directions. This is especially true if the subject welcomes an opportunity for mental catharsis.
TD, like alcohol, should be administered only after some measure of rapport has been established. It is more effective when it is administered during an interrogation that is carried out in a relaxed and informal social situation rather than in a formal military or civilian interrogation.
In the experiments reported here the establishment of rapport with all subjects was facilitated by the fact that the examiners were not the enemy, and by the subject’s knowledge that betraying information to the experimenters was not as dangerous as betraying it to the enemy. This indicates that the drug would lose some of its effectiveness if the subject were being interrogated by an enemy agent, as long as the subject remained hostile and suspicious.
The inferences from these observations must, unfortunately, be limited since the work had to be discontinued before suitable comparison of the effect of TD could be made with those of caffeine, benzedrine, scopolamine and barbiturates.
SUMMARY
Experiments were performed to ascertain whether TD facilitated interrogation.
TD was found to increase loquacity. This increase averaged forty percent with a range of from nineteen to eighty-four percent.
In addition, TD improves rapport, and increases self-confidence and feelings of security in the subject, so that he believes he can engage in conversation without betraying confidential or secret information. TD induces the subject to relax his guard and to betray information, usually indirectly.
In this limited study anxious, cautious and obsessive persons were found to reveal information less often than those without such personality disturbances. In a few subjects with personality disturbance manifested by immaturity, hostility and rebelliousness it was found that loquacity decreased after the administration of TD.
TD can be compared in action and effectiveness in interrogation to alcoholic beverages. It has an added advantage in that it is administrable without the knowledge of the subject since it is tasteless and effective in small amounts.
While there is some evidence to indicate that the psychogalvanometer can be useful in uncovering information, TD does not increase this usefulness.
Kit’s Take
Reading the full OSS “Truth Drug” material is fascinating and unsettling in equal measure. It sits right on the edge between scientific curiosity, wartime desperation, and the birth of modern psychological manipulation.
Here’s what stands out — both intellectually and ethically:
🧠 1. Remarkably sophisticated for 1945
For a wartime intelligence agency, the OSS was doing real behavioral science: experimental design, control groups, personality profiling, physiological measurement, statistical summaries.
They weren’t just “drugging people and watching what happened” — they were trying to systematize human suggestibility, using methods that today we’d call psychophysiology or cognitive neuroscience.
They were, in a sense, building an early model of what would become applied psychological warfare.
⚗️ 2. They discovered the limits of chemistry
What’s striking is that they reached a conclusion that the CIA and military would keep rediscovering for the next 30 years:
No drug can make someone tell the truth.
Drugs only change mood, confidence, or fear — and those effects depend on personality and environment.
They realized that “truth” comes from rapport, trust, and psychological leverage, not from chemistry. That insight — quietly buried in an OSS memo — is more scientifically sound than a lot of what was tried under MK-ULTRA a decade later.
🧩 3. Early understanding of social dynamics
Their commentary on rapport, loquacity, and indirect questioning reads almost like a modern manual for interrogation psychology.
They understood that direct pressure causes silence, that “friendly” informality disarms suspicion, and that information is most often betrayed incidentally.
That’s closer to motivational interviewing or forensic behavioral interviewing than to coercive interrogation.
In a way, they stumbled into the idea that the best interrogator is part psychologist, part actor.
⚖️ 4. Ethical hindsight
Even though OSS used volunteers, it’s clear they saw psychological manipulation as a technical problem to be solved, not a moral one.
That utilitarian mindset — “what works, regardless of consequence” — directly fed into postwar CIA projects like ARTICHOKE and MK-ULTRA, where consent vanished and the subjects were often prisoners or unwitting civilians.
You can see the philosophical seed of those later abuses in these early documents. It’s science serving secrecy rather than transparency.
🧬 5. Cultural irony
The “Truth Drug” was literally a refined cannabis extract — the same plant later criminalized and demonized during the Cold War.
In 1945, it was an OSS research tool; by 1955, it was a social threat; by 2025, it’s a legal industry and medical treatment.
History loops strangely: what began as a covert “weapon of truth” ended up as a wellness product.
🧭 My takeaway
This report is one of those rare documents that shows the birth of an idea — that the mind could be hacked scientifically.
The OSS didn’t find a truth serum. What they found, unintentionally, was the fragility and complexity of human communication.
They tried to solve secrecy with chemistry, and instead rediscovered psychology.
🌿 1. Anslinger’s War vs. the OSS’s Curiosity
By 1937, Harry Anslinger, head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), had successfully lobbied for the Marihuana Tax Act, effectively criminalizing cannabis nationwide.
He did this through an intense propaganda campaign painting marijuana as a dangerous, insanity-inducing drug associated with “jazz culture” and “moral decline.”
Yet only eight years later, another branch of the same federal government — the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)— was experimenting with a purified cannabis derivative (tetrahydrocannabinol acetate) to use as a “truth serum.”
So even while Anslinger was publicly condemning cannabis as a corrupting social evil, OSS scientists (with government funding) were quietly exploring it as a tool of national security.
That contradiction captures a broader truth: early drug policy was politically moralistic, while early intelligence work was technocratic and utilitarian. They both used “science,” but for totally opposite purposes.
⚖️ 2. Legal Loopholes and Wartime Secrecy
During WWII, the OSS operated under special wartime exemptions and secrecy provisions — meaning they could access substances that were otherwise restricted.
The FBN did supply drugs to the OSS under controlled conditions, and Anslinger himself had working relationships with intelligence figures (he even provided narcotics for some of the CIA’s early MK-ULTRA experiments later on).
So, paradoxically, the same man who criminalized cannabis also helped facilitate its experimental use in covert research when national security demanded it.
🧠 3. From the Tax Act to the Controlled Substances Act
You’re right that the Marihuana Tax Act was struck down in 1969 by the Supreme Court in Leary v. United States, which ruled it unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth Amendment (it required people to incriminate themselves by registering as marijuana users).
In response, Nixon pushed through the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970, which created the DEA’s Schedule system.
That’s where cannabis was placed in Schedule I, officially defined as having “no accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.”
The CSA was the legal foundation of the modern War on Drugs — a policy shift that was as political as it was pharmacological.
🧩 4. The Irony
So, the timeline looks like this:
1937: Marijuana Tax Act criminalizes cannabis (Anslinger’s FBN).
1943–45: OSS tests tetrahydrocannabinol acetate as a truth serum on agents and POWs.
1950s–60s: CIA continues “truth drug” and mind-control research under ARTICHOKE and MK-ULTRA.
1969: Marijuana Tax Act ruled unconstitutional.
1970: Nixon signs the Controlled Substances Act — doubling down on criminalization just as research (and counterculture) began rediscovering therapeutic uses.
So, while one part of the government was weaponizing cannabis as a psychological tool, another was destroying careers and imprisoning citizens for using the same plant.
It’s a perfect example of how state power can treat the same molecule as both a tool and a threat, depending on who controls it.
⚖️ 1. The Case That Broke the Government’s Own Logic
In 1976, Robert C. Randall, a D.C. resident suffering from advanced glaucoma, was arrested for cultivating cannabis at home.
Instead of pleading out, he mounted a medical necessity defense — arguing that cannabis was the only thing preventing him from going blind, and that the law couldn’t force him to sacrifice his health to obey a blanket prohibition.
The D.C. Superior Court agreed.
The judge ruled that Randall’s cannabis use was justified by medical necessity — the first time in U.S. history a court formally recognized marijuana’s legitimate medical use.
This completely undermined the government’s claim under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) that cannabis had “no accepted medical use.”
🏛️ 2. The Federal Government’s Reluctant Capitulation
Randall didn’t stop there.
He petitioned the FDA, DEA, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) for legal access to cannabis through existing medical research channels.
In 1978, after months of bureaucratic battles and public pressure, the government agreed to supply him pre-rolled cannabis cigarettes from its own farm at the University of Mississippi under what became known as the Compassionate Investigational New Drug (IND) Program.
That meant the same government that had outlawed marijuana and imprisoned thousands for it was now growing, rolling, and mailing cannabis to a private citizen every month — for medical use.
Randall became the first legal federal medical marijuana patient in U.S. history.
🌿 3. The Compassionate IND Program and Its Legacy
Following Randall’s precedent, other patients with severe conditions — glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, AIDS, and cancer — applied for similar access.
By the early 1990s, more than 30 patients were approved under the Compassionate IND program.
But in 1992, under President George H. W. Bush, the program was frozen to new applicants after HIV/AIDS patients began applying in large numbers.
Only the original participants (eight remained alive at that time) continued receiving government cannabis — a bizarre, quiet contradiction to federal policy that persisted into the 2000s.
🧩 4. Why Randall’s Victory Mattered
Randall’s case marks the first official federal recognition that cannabis has medical value — nearly 40 years after the government had criminalized it and 30 years after it had secretly experimented with it for intelligence purposes.
It’s poetic in a way:
In the 1940s, cannabis was seen by the state as a weapon for truth extraction.
By the 1970s, it was condemned as a threat to social order.
And in the 1980s onward, it re-emerged as a medicine — not through lab research, but through a citizen forcing the government to confront its own evidence.
Randall didn’t just win his sight; he exposed the moral and scientific inconsistencies of federal drug policy.
⚔️ 1. The “Good Soldiers” Paradox
From WWII through Vietnam and into the Cold War, service members were used in drug and psychological experiments — often without informed consent.
Programs like:
The OSS “Truth Drug” tests you mentioned.
The CIA’s Project MK-ULTRA, which secretly dosed military personnel and hospital patients with LSD.
The Army’s Edgewood Arsenal experiments, where troops were exposed to nerve agents, hallucinogens, and chemical weapons.
In all these cases, soldiers were trusted enough to risk their lives, but not respected enough to make informed choices about their bodies.
🪖 2. Then They Come Home
After service, many veterans live with:
Chronic pain
Traumatic brain injury
PTSD
Sleep disorders
Addiction to opioids prescribed by the VA
And yet, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) — because cannabis remains federally Schedule I under the Controlled Substances Act — cannot prescribe, recommend, or even assist with medical marijuana use, even in states where it’s legal.
VA doctors can’t fill out state medical marijuana forms or discuss dosing, despite the fact that:
Dozens of studies show benefits for PTSD, pain, and anxiety.
Veterans themselves overwhelmingly report that cannabis helps reduce reliance on opioids and improves quality of life.
⚖️ 3. The Human Cost of Bureaucracy
So we end up with this cruel irony:
The government once drugged soldiers in secret, but now refuses them access to a drug that might actually help.
Veterans can lose benefits if they admit cannabis use in a federal context.
Meanwhile, the same federal government literally still grows medical cannabis at the University of Mississippi — a continuation of the same supply chain that began with Robert Randall in the 1970s.
It’s as if the system learned nothing from its own history — or worse, learned that control matters more than care.
🌿 4. Where Things Stand Today
There are signs of progress:
Congress has repeatedly introduced bipartisan bills (like the VA Medicinal Cannabis Research Act) to force the VA to study or allow medical marijuana.
As of 2025, most U.S. states allow some form of medical cannabis, and many specifically include PTSD as a qualifying condition.
But federal scheduling still blocks real access, research, and VA support.
Until cannabis is rescheduled or descheduled, veterans are caught between two governments:
one that calls them heroes, and one that treats their medicine like contraband.
